We present a simple proof of existence of subgame perfect equilibria in games with perfect information.
Introduction
This note presents a simple proof of a theorem by Harris [4] on the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in games of perfect information. More generally, it illustrates a method for establishing existence of equilibria in such games, and allows for a new characterization of equilibrium outcomes that provides an algorithm for their computation.
The method we present consists of approximating the payoff function of each player by a sequence of simple functions, in a way that is standard in measure and integration theory (see, for example, Wheeden and Zygmund [5] ). The sequence of approximating payoff functions for each player, in addition of being a sequence of simple functions, satisfies two other important properties: first, it converges uniformly to the payoff function of that player in the original game; and second, the approximation is such that outcomes that are dominated according to the some payoff function in the approximating sequence are also dominated (by the same outcome) according to the original payoff function, and to all the subsequent payoff functions in the sequence.
The above approximation of each player's payoff function induces a sequence of games that differ from the original game only on the payoff function.
For this sequence of games, it is easy to establish that each of them has a nonempty, compact set of equilibrium outcomes, and that the sequence of those sets shrinks to the set of equilibrium outcomes of the original game -thus, the original game has a nonempty, compact set of equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, the set of equilibrium outcomes of the original game can be computed by intersecting the corresponding sets of the approximating games.
Games of Perfect Information
In order to present our argument in the simplest possible way, we will consider only the case of games of perfect information with two players. It should be noted that nothing in our argument depends on this assumption, and our proof could be easily extended to the case of an arbitrary finite number of players. Finally, using a "truncation argument" similar to the one used by Harris [4, section 4.4, page 624] (see also Börgers [1] ), one could extent our result to the case of a denumerable number of players.
A game of perfect information (with two players) is
where (1) S i is a nonempty set, for i = 1, 2, (2) A 2 is a nonempty valued correspondence from S 1 into S 2 , and (3),
When player 2 moves at stage 2, it is with perfect information on s 1 .
Hence the set of strategies of player i, i = 1, 2, is F 1 = S 1 and
and
Given a game of perfect information G the vector (f 1 , f 2 (f 1 )) in H determined uniquely by (f 1 , f 2 ) is called an equilibrium path of G. 1 In what follows we show that the existence of an equilibrium is equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium path. Therefore, we can show that a subgame perfect equilibrium exists by showing that an equilibrium path exists, which is a simpler task. The reason is that, under the assumption we shall use, the 1 More precisely, the set of equilibrium paths of a game of perfect information is P = {(x, y) ∈ H : there exists an subgame perfect equilibrium (f 1 , f 2 ) such that f 1 = x and
set of equilibrium paths is compact, while the set of equilibrium strategies typically is not (see Harris [3, proposition 4] ).
Define a correspondence E 2 from S 1 into S 2 as follows:
this correspondence gives the equilibrium paths of the one-player game A 2 (s 1 ), P 2 .
The set
is then easily seen to be the set of equilibrium paths of the game G = S i , A 2 , P i i=1,2 (i.e., in the notation of footnote 1, E 1 = P .)
Lemma 1 A game of perfect information has a subgame perfect equilibrium
if and only if E 1 = ∅ and E 2 (s 1 ) = ∅, for all s 1 ∈ S 1 .
Proof. Necessity follows from the fact that if (f 1 , f 2 ) is a subgame perfect
For sufficiency, let (x, y) ∈ E 1 . Define player 1 strategy by f 1 = x. For
it follows that there exists s 2 ∈ E 2 (s 1 ) such that
hence we define f 2 (s 1 ) = s 2 . 2 be a game of perfect information, and assume that for all i = 1, 2, P i (H) ⊂ [0, 1). For i = 1, 2 and k ∈ N, let P k i : H → R be defined by
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for j = 1, . . . , 2 k . Define G k = S i , A 2 , P k i i=1,2 , for all k ∈ N. We have that P k i − P i ∞ ≤ 1 2 k , and also that P k i is a simple function; this last fact allows us to solve the game G k by backwards induction, and thus show that it has a subgame perfect equilibrium. The following lemma summarizes this fact.
Lemma 2 For all k ∈ N, G k has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. It follows immediately by backward induction:
and so there exists s * 2 that maximizes s 2 → P 2 (s 1 , s 2 ) in A(s 1 ). Thus, define
This defines an optimal strategy f 2 : S 1 → S 2 for player 2.
Similarly, since P 1 is simple, then {P 1 (s 1 , f 2 (s 1 )) : s 1 ∈ S 1 } is finite, and so there exists s * 1 that maximizes s 1 → P 1 (s 1 , f 2 (s 1 )) in S 1 . Thus, define
This defines an optimal strategy f 1 ∈ S 1 for player 1. Clearly,
is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We will prove Harris' theorem by approximating a given game G by a sequence of games {G k } ∞ k=1 as defined above. In fact, this will be a consequence of Theorem 1 below, which shows that the set of equilibrium outcomes of G k converges to the set of equilibrium outcomes of G.
, be a game of perfect information.
Suppose that
1. for all i = 1, 2, S i is a compact topological space;
2. H is a closed subset of S 1 × S 2 ;
3. for all i = 1, 2, P i is continuous;
for all s 1 ∈ S 1 .
Proof. We show first that
This follows from the fact that for all i = 1, 2 and h, l ∈ H,
First, we will show that y ∈ E 2 (x). Let s 2 ∈ A 2 (x), k ∈ N, and {s j } j∈J k be such that s j ∈ A(x k j ) for all j, and s j → s 2 (such net exist since A is lower hemi-continuous). Since for all j ∈ J k we have that y k j ∈ E k 2 (x k j ), then
and so,
since P 2 is continuous. Finally, letting k → ∞, it follows that
Hence, it follows that y ∈ E 2 (x).
We are left to show that for all s 1 ∈ S 1 there exists s 2 ∈ E 2 (s 1 ) such
Since {w k j } j∈J k ⊆ A 2 (s 1 ), and A 2 (s 1 ) is compact, we may assume that Proof. First note that because H is compact and P i is continuous for i = 1, 2, there is no loss in generality by assuming that P i (H) ⊂ [0, 1), for all of H. Hence, it follows from Theorem 1 that E 2 (s 1 ) is nonempty, for all s 1 ∈ S 1 , and that E 1 is nonempty, which completes the proof.
Remark 1 Note that the above Theorem dispenses with the assumption used by Harris [4] that S i , i = 1, 2, is Hausdorff.
